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Appellant maintains he was denied his right to due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 12 of the Utah 




ADDENDUM B TO THE STATE'S PRINCIPAL BRIEF. THE 
STATE'S BRIEF IN STATE v. LARSEN BEFORE THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE 
STATE'S PRINCIPAL BRIEF HEREIN. 
In reply to the Appellant's argument that the trial court erred by permitting an 
expert to testify as to what particular facts constitute materiality in a Securities Fraud case, 
the State has relied upon this Court's ruling in State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 
1992). However, the State has done more than rely on this precedent. The State has also 
incorporated by reference the State's brief in Larsen before the Utah Supreme Court on 
Writ of Certiorari (Addendum B, State's principal brief). This is an inappropriate use of an 
addendum under Rule 24(f). 
Inclusion of a respondent's brief in a related case before a different appellate court 
is beyond the scope of the addenda authorized by Rule (24)(f). Moreover, Rule 24(g) limits 
principal briefs to 50 pages. The State's principal brief in this matter is 53 pages. 
Addendum B, the State's brief in State v. Larsen before the Utah Supreme Court on Writ 
of Certiorari, is 29 pages. Together, these two briefs total 82 pages. This exceeds the 50-
page limit imposed by Rule 24(g). The State's efforts to circumvent the page restriction of 
Rule 24(g) should be rejected and the State's brief in State v. Larsen before the Utah 
Supreme Court on Writ of Certiorari should be stricken from the State's principal brief in 
the instant matter. 
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POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE 
STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS TO STATE AS OPINION AN 
IMPERMISSIBLE LEGAL CONCLUSION OVER THE 
DEFENDANTS OBJECTION, 
In State v. Larsen, the I Jtah Coui t of Appeals i uled that expert testimon> on v, hat 
constitutes materiality was permissible fact-oriented testimony as distinguished from 
impermissible legal conclusions: M[W]e are persuaded by Lueben that the use of the term 
"material" may be admitted as permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon review of the 
record, we conclude that the expert in this case used the term "material" in a factual sense." 
Larsen. 828 P.2d al 493. 
One of the two experts permitted to testify at the trial of this matter over the 
Appellant's objection was not restricted to expressing opinions solely about materiality in a 
criminal Securities Fraud case. Steve Neilson, the assistant director of the Utah Securities 
Division, was permitted over defense objection to offer the following impermissible legal 
conclusion: 
Q Now, looking at true selling away - we'll leave aside this 
other question of what happens if you have two broker-
age houses. Is true selling away legal? 
A. No, it is illegal. 
(T. Tr. 895). 
This type of opinion testimony is precisely the type of impei missible legal conclusion 
prohibited by State v. Larsen, supra. The Court of Appeals in Larsen cited with approval 
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Scop v. United States. 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir., modified on rehearing 856 F.2d 5 (1988)); 
Marx & Company. Inc. v Diner's Club. Inc.. 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied. 434 
U.S. 861 (1977); and Adalman v. Barker Watts & Company. 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986), 
for the proposition that legal conclusions are not properly admitted into evidence. Just as 
in Scop. Marx, and Adalman. the Mr. Neilson's opinion that true selling away was illegal 
constituted an impermissible legal conclusion. 
Expressing an opinion that "true selling away" is illegal is not a fact-oriented opinion. 
Testimony is not helpful to the factfinder if it is couched as a legal conclusion. Hogan v. 
American Tel & Tel. Co.. 812 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1987); Davidson v. Prince. 813 p.2d 1225, 
1231 (Utah App. 1991) ("questions which allow a witness to simply tell a jury what result to 
reach are not permitted.11); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah 
App. 1991) ("A witness may testify as to the defendant's actions, including whether the 
defendant acted with care; however, the witness may not consider all the facts and render 
a final legal conclusion."). 
Expressing an opinion that selling away is illegal is not the same as expressing an 
opinion about materiality in a factual sense. This is not merely an ultimate fact. Whether 
selling away is illegal is indisputably a legal conclusion. Indeed, it was the very legal 
conclusion that the jury was required to decide in Counts 1-3 (did the Defendant fail to 
disclose to his customers that he was selling Red River Limited Partnerships without the 
approval of Private Ledger?) and in Count 4 (did the Defendant fail to disclose to Private 
Ledger that he was selling away Red River Limited Partnerships to customers?). Under the 
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State's theory, if the jury found that the Defendant was "selling away" the Red River Limited 
Partnership, them lie was guili\ ot seniiiiitw fraud on all i ounis alleged in the Information. 
Whether the Defendant's conduct was legal or illegal was precisely the question the jury had 
been impanelled to decide. 
The problem is exacerbated by the vagueness of the question. As the state correctly 
notes in footnote 12, the Defendant was not charged with a crime entitled "selling away." 
No statute specifically designates srllmy away as a crime, The vagueness of the question and 
its lack of reference to an element of an offense charged invites both the jury's speculation 
and the jury's misapplication of the law. Mr. Neilson's position as a lawyer compounded the 
problem of invading the province of the judge to instruct the jury on the law applicable to 
the charged offenses. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
A. The Defendant's trial counsels failure to make an opening statement constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The first prong of the two-prong test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 446 
U.S. 668 (1984), requires a defendant ft" sln»w fh;il Ins counsel's rrpresentntion fd! below 
an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. Under Strickland, however, 
appellate courts will not normally second guess a lawyer's strategic or tactical decisions. In 
the instant matter, the State has endeavored to characterize Mr. Barber's failure to deliver 
an opening statement as a strategic decision. The State's novel theory is that Mr. Barber's 
5 
"decision" to forego an opening statement was a strategic decision, albeit a subconscious one. 
The State's disingenuous argument should be eschewed. 
A strategic decision contemplates reflection upon the benefits and disadvantages of 
various courses of conduct. While a decision can be based upon years of experience and can 
be made quickly in response to the rapidly unfolding events of trial, a decision certainly 
requires cognitive thought and a selection of strategy. A strategic decision cannot be made 
on a subconscious level. 
The record is clear that Mr. Barber did not make a strategic decision to forego 
giving an opening statement. Although he had reserved the right to give an opening 
statement and had, in fact, planned to do so, Mr. Barber simply forgot to carry out his 
intention. The following colloquy demonstrates that Mr. Barber did not make a strategic 
decision to forego giving an opening statement: 
Q. (Mr. Bugden): When you began your case and didn't give 
an opening statement, at the precise moment that you called 
your first witness, did you go through a thought process where 
you considered the merits of "Okay, I am not going to give an 
opening statement?" or "Okay, I am going to give an opening 
statement?" 
A. I do not believe I did. 
• • • 
Q. Mr. Barber, in a number of conversations you and I had over the last 
several days, both yesterday and then today, did you teD me that you forgot 
to give the opening statement? 
A. I may have used the words "I forgot." 
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Q. (Mr. Sonnenreich): You mentioned that you told Mr. 
Bugden that you "forgot" to make an opening statement 
perhaps in the last couple of days. Can you elaborate why you 
used the word "forgot"? 
A. WeD I think I did tell Wally as a part of a longer statement 
about the issue, that I forgot to make the statement. But what 
I intended to imply by that, counsel, was that at the time that 
I didn't stand up and commence to make an opening state-
ment, I didn't engage in an act of mental process about the 
issue of making a statement at a l l . . . I did not engage in any 
mental process that I can now recall about whether to make an 
opening statement or not at the beginning of our case . . . I did 
not engage in the processes to make a conscious decision at 
that time . . . 
State's Addendum C to State's Brief pp. 48-49. 
Q. (Mr. Bugden): You didn't go through a thought process, a 
cognitive process at all with regard to the opening statement. 
A. That is correct. 
(Addendum C to State's Brief, p. 52). 
The second part of the Strickland test requires a Defendant to demonstrate that but 
for the conduct which falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result. Strickland at 694. Admittedly, it is difficult to 
predict just how important an opening statement might be in a securities fraud trial. In the 
instant case, however, the absence of an opening statement coupled with the closing 
argument delivered by Mr. Barber lead one to the inescapable conclusion that the outcome 
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of the trial would have been different but for Mr. Barber's objectively inadequate 
performance. 
Central to the State's theory on all four counts was its allegation that the Defendant 
neglected to disclose the possibility of future payments to the investors. Although the 
Defendant realized that future payments were possible under the terms of the prospectus 
of the Red River Limited Partnership, he also believed - based upon Mr. Farnsworth's track 
record and representations that he would turn the property over in one year - that future 
payments would never be required. The following jury instruction excerpts are applicable 
to these facts: 
The securities fraud statute under which Counts 1, 2, 3 and 
4 of the information are brought is concerned only with such 
"material1' misstatements or such "material" omissions and does 
not cover minor, or meaningless or unimportant ones. (Instruc-
tion No. 22). 
A "material fact", is a fact that a reasonable person would 
deem important in determining whether or not to purchase a 
security. (Instruction No. 21). 
If you find that the defendant acted in good faith, or are not 
sure that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud, you 
shaD not convict the defendant on the theory that he employed 
a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. (Instruction No. 26). 
Despite the existence of an argument, based on these facts and law, that the 
Defendant was not guilty of Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4, Mr. Barber never explained to the jury 
how to find the Defendant not guilty of those Counts, notwithstanding his failure to disclose 
the possibility of future payments. Although the instructions to the jury were the legal tools 
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by which Mr. Barber could have explained to the jury why a verdict of "not guilty" was not 
only possible, but was also necessary, Mr. Barber never even referred to the jury instructions 
in his closing argument. Surely a reference to Instruction No. 26, and the Defendant's good 
faith belief that no future payments would accrue was essential to the Defendant's theory 
of the case. Yet the closest that Mr. Barber came to explaining to the jury why they should 
not convict the Defendant for failing to disclose the possibility of future payments is as 
follows: 
I am not sure that it is an excuse that Ron believed, that these 
people were never going to get to the point of needing those 
payments, but it isn't a crime that he believed it and omitted to 
tell it to someone. There is a massive difference. He truly 
believe what Farnsworth told him... that nobody is ever going 
to have to make any second payments . . . but I can see that 
Ron knew or should have known there was a potential of 
future payments even though he didn't think it would happen. 
Mr. Barber could have mitigated the consequences of his forgetting to give an 
opening statement by giving at least an adequate closing argument. However, Mr. Barber's 
closing argument was less than adequate. By failing to explain to the jury how the law on 
materiality and the Defendant's good faith belief should be applied to the facts, i.e. 
possibility of future payments, Mr. Barber effectively insured the Defendant's conviction. 
In sum, Mr. Barber's failure to give an opening statement together with his deficient closing 
argument lead one to believe the Defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance 
of counsel. 
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B. The Defendant's trial counsel's failure to introduce critical evidence constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Mr. Barber failed to introduce Verl Thornton's subscription booklet relating to the 
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership which included both the Subscription Agreement 
(in which Mr. Thornton agreed to purchase the security) and the suitability questionnaire 
(which was used to determine whether Mr. Thornton was suitable for this particular 
investment). The State suggests that "this smacks strongly of a tactical decision." State's 
brief p. 31. However, the State's intuitive characterization is unsupported by the record: 
Q. (By Mr. Bugden) Do you, sir, know or did you 
discuss with Mr. Barber prior to Mr. Thornton 
testifying, whether or not you and Mr. Barber, as 
a matter of strategy, would forego the possibility 
or the opportunity to introduce the subscription 
agreement through Mr. Thornton? 
A. (Mr. Harry) We did not [discuss] to forego it. 
We were going to do it. 
Q. How do you know that you were going to do it? 
A. Well, I had spent a considerable amount of time 
pointing out the subscription agreement to Mr. 
Barber beforehand. 
Q. Why was the subscription agreement important? 
A. Well, he - it clearly shows the nature of the 
investment. I mean, he signed up as to the 
number of units he was going to buy and what 
type of an investment it was. 
Q. When Mr. Barber omitted or failed to ask Mr. 
Thornton to identify the subscription agreement, 
did he do so as the result of a tactical decision? 
10 
A. No. 
Q. And did it come as a surprise to you that Mr. 
Barber failed to introduce that document. 
A. I am very surprised. 
Q. Okay. And Mr. Barber neglected to introduce 
the document for whatever reason, through Mr. 
Thornton; did he then endeavor to introduce the 
document through you? 
A. He did. 
Q. And did the State object? 
A. Vehemently. 
Q. And did the State succeed in keeping the docu-
ment out? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for a New Trial (March 18, 1992) pp. 20, 26. 
Q. (By Mr. Bugden) [D]id you also acknowledge in 
conversations with me, Mr. Barber, that if you 
had an opportunity to re-try this case, you would 
indeed attempt to introduce the Subscription 
Agreement through Verl Thornton? Did you tell 
me that yesterday? 
A. (Mr. Barber) What I told you was is that when 
Ron reminded me that I hadn't done it, I at-
tempted to do it. And if I had to do it again, I 
would probably put it in. 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial (April 10, 1992) p. 40. 
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Thus, Mr. Barber's failure to introduce the subscription booklet was not the result of a 
tactical decision. The subscription booklet was necessary to demonstrate that Mr. Thornton 
was aware of the possibility of future payments. The suitability questionnaire was critical 
documentary evidence contradicting Mr. Thornton's testimony that the Red River Limited 
Partnership was inconsistent with the investment goals he had discussed with the Defendant. 
The failure to introduce the subscription booklet and the suitability questionnaire fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness. 
The State's invitation to lay the blame for the failure to introduce this subscription 
booklet at the feet of the Defendant must be rejected. The State has argued, "Ron Harry, 
a particularly intelligent Defendant, was also actively engaged in his own defense. Indeed, 
he regularly passed notes to Mr. Barber throughout the trial, and Mr. Barber almost always 
checked with Harry before leaving a witness." (State's brief p. 33). None of these assertions 
are supported by the record and may not be considered. The State has failed to cite those 
portions of the record that support these allegations as required by Rule 24(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the State's attempt to argue any facts not 
properly cited to, or supported by, the record must be eschewed. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat. 
Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 
1991). 
Turning to the second prong of the Strickland test, it is reasonably likely that Mr. 
Barber's deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial. Defendant had been given 
discretion to make investments on behalf of Mr. Thornton (T. Tr. p. 52). Thus, establishing 
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Mr. Thornton's suitability for the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership investment was 
vital to the defense strategy. The subscription booklet contained the information from which 
the Defendant concluded that Mr. Thornton was suitable for the investment: 
Q. (By Mr. Barber) In the case of Mr. Thornton, 
what was your judgment about this deal being 
suitable to him, including the fact that it featured 
future payments and was a limited partnership? 
A (Defendant) Mr. Thornton had a securities port-
folio in excess of $400,000 in this particular 
account. He had tens of thousands of dollars in 
securities, cash, and equivalents in other accounts. 
He owned free and clear both homes in Salt Lake 
and in Arizona. He had real estate experience in 
the past, as far as liability as a general partner in 
the trailer park, as a limited partner in at least 
one real estate limited partnership. He was 
clearly suitable. 
T. Tr. p. 172. 
When the evidence is viewed as a whole, a reasonable likelihood exists that but for 
Mr. Barber's failure to introduce the subscription booklet and the suitability questionnaire, 
the verdict on Count 1 would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 must be reversed for insufficient evidence. When a reversal is 
based upon insufficient evidence, double jeopardy precludes a second trial. State v. 
Musselman. 667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1983); State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 470 n. 4 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Alternatively, the case should be remanded for a new trial on all 
counts. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £- I day of 21 ^J^^pJir^m 
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